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Equalization to Integration 
IZn'vate and Government Sponsorship of Refugees 
Private sponsorship was introduced as 
a mode of augmenting the intake of ref- 
ugees into Canada above and beyond 
those brought in under direct govern- 
ment sponsorship. The model has been 
a tremendous success, but there have 
been numerous proposals to equalize 
and/or integrate the two schemes be- 
cause of the differential successes as 
well as the inequities of the two models. 
The Minister of Employment and Im- 
migration has already introduced a 
number of measures to reduce inequit- 
ies through changes in the eligibility 
criteria for training and in benefits for 
privately sponsored refugees, and has 
pledged to establish a program of joint 
sponsorship .l 
Before an integrated model is imple- 
mented as a third stage in partnership 
of the public and private sectors, sev- 
eral steps would be helpful. First, a 
careful review of the objectives of such 
a model would be necessary. Also, an 
assessment of existing data relevant to 
such integration and an examination of 
what policies would need to be altered 
and what short and long term con- 
sequences might be anticipated for 
each model of integration could then 
follow. 
A refugee resettlement policy relevant 
to the creation of an integrated model 
would need to take several factors into 
account. 
I. Limiting Parameters 
- There should be no mandatory pri- 
vate sponsorship of government spon- 
sored refugees. 
- The policy should not exclude pri- 
vate sponsorship of refugees. 
2. Selection 
(a) Numbers - The number of re- 
fugees taken in should not decrease, 
and, if possible, should be increased. 
(b) Choice - The refugees selected 
should be those most in need. At the 
same time, the refugees selected should 
reflect those desired by sponsors in 
Canada. (These two objectives are not 
inherently compatible but they are not 
inherently irreconcilable either .) 
(c) Speed - The new model should not 
inhibit the requirement of an emerg- 
ency response to crisis situations. 
3. Adaptation 
(a) The model should ensure all ref- 
ugees resettled in Canada have equal 
access to services, programs and 
allowances. 
(b) The model should ensure that no 
private sponsorship group carries an 
unanticipated totally disproportionate 
share of the burdens of sponsorship. 
(Among Indochinese sponsorship 
groups, 16% of the refugees required 
support beyond one year and 60% of 
these were supported by their spon- 
sors .) 
(c) The model should be consistent, if 
possible, in giving priority either to 
language and cultural adaptation or to 
economic self-sufficiency. 
(d) The model should attempt to give 
government sponsored refugees the 
same advantages provided by the per- 
sonal private networks for privately 
sponsored refugees that enabled them 
to obtain jobs four weeks earlier than 
government sponsored refugees and, 
perhaps (as in Quebec), achieve a 
higher participation rate in employ- 
ment. 
(e) The model should attempt to pro- 
vide as many refugees as possible with 
a personal volunteer support system 
which has shown to be so effective and 
beneficial in the resettlement of ref- 
ugees, a benefit which most govern- 
ment sponsored refugees do not now 
presently enjoy. 
4. Costs 
The new model should not cost any 
more in total costs or in the cost per 
government sponsored refugee and, if 
possible, should utilize the savings, 
through the use of private sponsorship, 
to augment the whole refugee intake 
program since, "the voluntary sector, 
properly supported, can provide the 
needed services more adequately than 
the Government directly, and at con- 
siderably less cost. "2 
5. Co-operation 
Any model proposed should be one 
which enhances and affirms real co- 
operation between the government and 
the private sector so that private spon- 
sors do not feel as if they are merely 
being used. They should be given op- 
portunities to participate in the form- 
ulation of policies affecting refugees. 
Second, any model proposed should 
facilitate the development of a three- 
way partnership which includes the ref- 
ugees themselves as well as the gov- 
ernment and private sectors. 
Comparative Data 
Comparative studies of cost and ad- 
justient factors related to private and 
government sponsorship reveal that, 
for exam~le. in the case of the Indo- 
A .  
chinese refugees, the settlement costs of 
private sponsorship were $753 less per 
refugee (a 33 1/3% saving) than the 
costs of government sponsored ref- 
ugees, after deduction of the base 
costs of transport, overseas costs, etc., 
for all refugees. The savings result 
from shorter support periods on av- 
erage, donated chattels (clothing, fur- 
niture, and appliances), and some don- 
ated professional services (legal, dental 
and accounting). 
Privately sponsored refugees obtained 
employment on an average of 4 weeks 
earlier than government sponsored ref- 
ugees in spite of the fact that govern- 
ment sponsored refugees had better 
language skills and higher educational 
qualifications. 
Also, the satisfaction with the personal 
support system contrasted with the dis- 
appointment refugees experienced in 
obtaining attention from overworked 
government counsellors.~ 
Alternative Sponsorship Models 
Simple cost sharing and per capita 
grants would significantly increase the 
costs to the government and would not 
provide private support for govern- 
ment sponsored refugees. A combin- 
ation loan/grant scheme might solve 
the cost problem but not the human 
support one. The friendship family 
model for government sponsored ref- 
ugees has worked well in some areas 
but has had difficulty in larger urban 
areas. 
An incentive scheme (which continues 
the principle of the government match- 
ing proposal initiated with the Indo- 
chinese Refugee Sponsorship Program 
but applied to the economics of in- 
dividual sponsorship) might be tried. 
There are at least two variations. 
Scheme A 
For every government sponsored ref- 
ugee co-sponsored by the private sec- 
TABLE 1 Coats Grant Available 
(In 1981 dollars) pm Refugee for Priv. Sponsor 
(1 (2) 
Estimated cost sponsorship per refugee 2100 2100 
331/3% savings of private sponsorship -700 -700 1400 
Estimated Cost of Government-Private 1400 1400 
Co-sponsorship 
tor, the government would pay one- 
half of the estimated costs of a ref- 
ugee sponsored by the private sector. 
In 1981 dollars, after deduction of 
$1400 base cost for all refugees, the 
calculation would be as illustrated in 
Table 1 above. 
As is the case now, church groups or 
collectives of individuals would sign up 
to co-sponsor refugees selected by the 
government. If they did so under an 
umbrella agreement, the umbrella or- 
ganization would receive $1400 for the 
expenses of the co-sponsored refugee 
plus a grant of $700 towards an addi- 
tional privately sponsored refugee. In- 
dividual groups could accumulate 
credits towards a future sponsorship or 
assign their credit. 
If fully utilized for 14,000 govern- 
ment sponsored refugees, it could re- 
sult in 7,000 privately sponsored ref- 
ugees. Since the normal number of 
anticipated privately sponsored refu- 
gees might be about half that num- 
ber, there would be an additional base 
cost of $1400 per refugee or about an 
extra $4,000,000 cost to the govern- 
ment. 
Scheme B 
For every three government sponsored 
refugees co-sponsored by the private 
sector, the government would pay the 
estimated costs of a refugee sponsored 
by the private sector. In 1982 dollars, 
after deduction of $1500 for base costs, 
the calculation would be as illustrated 
in Table 2 above. 
If there are now an estimated 3,000 pri- 
vate sponors per year and the program 
above were fully utilized to increase 
private sponsorships to 4,000, Scheme 
B would produce enough revenues to 
contribute towards the base costs of 
2,000 such sponsorships. Since the 
government now pays the base costs of 
all 3,000 privately sponsored refugees, 
there would be a new saving of $1500 
for 1,000 refugees or $1,500,000. These 
funds could be used as a contingency 
fund: 
(a) to pay for improved back-up ser- 
vices to refugees; 
TABLE 2 Costs Grant Available 
(In 1982 dollars) Per Refugee For For (1) (2) (3) Priv. Sponsor Base Costs 
Estimated cost of gov't 2250 2250 2250 
sponsorship 
One-third Saving -750 -750 -750 1500 750 
Estimated Cost of Gov't-Private 1500 1500 1500 
Cosponsorship 
Objective 
Selection 
(a) Numbers 
(b) Choice 
- need 
- sponsors 
(c) Speed 
Adaptation 
(a) Equal 
access to 
Services 
(b) Equity to 
Sponsors 
(c) Priority 
language or 
economic 
adaptation 
(d) Network for 
Economic 
Adaptation 
(e) Personal 
Contact for 
Gov't 
sponsored 
refugees 
Costs 
TABLE 3 
Scheme A Scheme B 
Would increase 20% Would increase 6.6% 
Responds to both but even Responds to both 
more sensitive to sponsors 
No inhibitions to emergency No inhibitions to 
response emergency response 
As at present but there Would increase services 
would be extra costs for the slightly for all refugees 
additional refugees 
No contingency for special Contingency fund for 
cases special cases 
Both schemes increase the bias 
to economic selt-sutficiency 
over language acquisition in 
the initial phases as this is a 
bias of private sponsorship 
Greater burden on 
fewer people 
There would be a greater 
incentive for the private 
sector to cosponsor gov't 
refugees and fewer people 
would need to be involved; 
therefore, there would be a 
greater probability for more 
gov't sponsored refugees to 
be cosponsored 
More cost to gov't. 
Decreased burden per 
person but more people 
needed 
Lesser probability that as 
as many gov't sponsored 
refugees would be 
co-sponsored 
Less cost to gov't so more 
left for improvements & 
contingencies 
(b) to subsidize any private sponsor- 
ship that ran into extraordinary costs 
above the average. 
Comparison of Scheme A and 
Scheme B - See Table 3 Above 
If both schemes are compared in rela- 
tion to the objectives outlined above, 
Scheme B is clearly better from the 
government perspective except for the 
fact that there is a decreased possibility 
that all government sponsored refugees 
would be supported by private net- 
works. From the private perspective, 
Scheme A seems better since more ref- 
ugees would be brought in and a higher 
proportion would be responsive to 
lSpeech to TESL, CANADA, Edmonton, Al- 
berta, Nov. 11, 1982, p. 14 -15. "I have also in- 
itiated . . . a proposal to undertake joint sponsor- 
ship between the federal government and private 
sponsors for refugees." cf. also the Minister's 
speech to the Canadian Polish Congress, Win- 
nipeg, Manitoba, Nov. 12,1982, p. 11. 
2"Evaluation of the Indochinese Refugee Group 
private priorities, but it would not 
have the advantage of Scheme B in off- 
setting inequities in private sponsor- 
ship or in improving back-up services. 
Conclusion 
Whatever plan is utilized, it is impera- 
tive that the process for developing a 
new model exemplify the process of co- 
operation of the private and govern- 
ment sectors. It should not emerge by 
fiat. The present process of federal/pri- 
vate sector consultations hopefully will 
not only result in a new, more effective 
model, but will also build a base for 
more systematic co-operation of the 
public and private sectors. 
Sponsorship Program." Canada Employment 
and Immigration, 1982. 
3cf. Lawrence Lam, 'Vietnamese-Chinese Re- 
fugees in Montreal," Ph.D Thesis, York Univer- 
sity, April, 1983, pp. 229-234. See also, M. 
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